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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-CHANGE OF VENUE ON MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF-

Plaintiff, a resident of California, was injured on defendant corporation's premises
in Nevada. Being unable to serve defendant in California, plaintiff started a negligence action in the Federal District Court in Nevada and then moved for a
change of venue to the proper Federal District Court in California under section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code.1 The Federal District Court of Nevada overruled
plaintiff's motion. On appeal, held, affirmed. The requirement under 1404(a)
that the action be transferred to any district "where it might have been brought"
precludes transfer to a forum where the defendant was not amenable to process.
Shapiro 11. Bonanza Hotel Co., (9th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 777.
Section 1404(a), added to the Judicial Code in 1948, is based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.2 The courts have been reluctant to allow a
change of venue under this new section on the motion of the plaintiff; it has been

1 "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought." 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §l404(a).
2 See Revisor's notes, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §1404(a).
''The doctrine of forum non conveniens is bottomed upon the right of the Court in
the exercise of its equitable powers to refuse the imposition upon its jurisdiction of the
trial of cases, even though venue is properly laid, if it appears that, for the convenience of
the litigants and the witnesses, in the interest of justice, the action should have been instituted in another forum where the action might have been brought." Hayes v. Chicago,
R.I. & P.R. Co., (D.C. Minn. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 821 at 824.
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held that the section is per s~ not available to plaintiffs.3 This is put on the
grounds that forum non conveniens was invoked only by defendants, and, since
plaintiff has voluntarily chosen his forum, he should not be allowed to change
it, especially over defendant's objection.4 As to the first ground, it should be
noted that there is nothing in the language of section 1404(a) that restricts its
application to defendants, and the section has been held to apply where forum
non conveniens does not. 5 Also, since the remedy under section 1404(a) is transfer rather than dismissal as under forum non conveniens, the limitations of the
latter should not be binding on section 1404(a) transfers. As to the contention
that the plaintiff has voluntarily chosen his forum, there may be cases where
developments after the commencement of the action make a second forum
more convenient. In addition, the plaintiff will be most likely to invoke section
1404(a) when for some reason he has been unable to maintain his action in the
more convenient forum. This raises the most serious problem the courts have
met in applying section 1404(a) to motions by the plaintiff. The principal case
denies plaintiff the right to transfer the action to a forum where defendant could
not be served. The court finds two principal objections to allowing such a transfer. The first is the requirement that the action be transferred to a district in
which it "might have been brought." The court holds that unless service could
have been obtained in the more convenient forum, the action could not have
been brought there within the meaning of section 1404(a). An approach which
was rejected in the principal case, but which there is some authority for, interprets
''brought'' as "commenced" and, since an action is commenced when the complaint is filed, 6 allows the action to be brought in any district of proper venue. 7
The second ground urged by the court in the principal case is that allowing a
transfer to a forum in which defendant could not have been served would circumvent the limitation on service of process to the state in which the district court is
sitting.8 As a matter of interpretation of the statute, the court is no doubt correct in holding that Congress did not have in mind a change, even indirectly,
in service requirements. There is a well established congressional policy in favor
a Barnhart v. John B. Rogers Producing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 86 F. Supp. 595.
4 Bolten v. General Motors Corp., (D.C. ill. 1949) 81 F. Supp. 851.
5Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944 (1949) (FELA actions); United States
v. National City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78, 69 S.Ct. 955 (1949) (anti-trust actions).
6Rule 3, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
7 Otto v. Hirl, (D.C. Iowa 1950) 89 F. Supp. 72. Plaintiff's motion allowed on the
basis of this construction of the section. There is good authority for this interpretation in
other connections. Goldenberg v. Murphy, 108 U.S. 162, 2 S.Ct. 388 (1883) (statute of
limitations); Rawle v. Phelps, 2 Flip. 471, 20 Fed. Cas. 320 (1879) (removal).
8 The court refers to Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, (2d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 949,
where it is said that allowing such circumvention in this case would give a preference to
diversity suits over all other actions which must be brought in the district wherein the
defendant resides [28 US.C. (Supp. III, 1950) §1391(b)], and that Congress would not
have intended such a result. In answer it may be said that the reason this would create a
preference is that Congress has already given plaintiffs a preferential treatment as to venue
in diversity actions. 28 U.S.C. §1391(a).

1951]

RECENT DECISIONS

345

of limited scope of process,0 and the federal rules seem to require that Congress
clearly indicate any intent to change these limitations.10 However, as a matter of
policy a different result might have been reached. There is no doubt that Congress has the power to change service limitations, 11 and the need for some relief
to plaintiffs who cannot afford to carry on a trial in a distant forum has long been
recognized.12 The danger of harassing defendants by allowing nationwide service would be nullified by the requirement that the district court exercise its discretion only upon a showing that the transfer will be in the interest of justice13
and supported by a preponderance of convenience.14 Since this relief could be
extended to plaintiffs without too strained a construction of the statute,15 it is
submitted that justice would be better served by doing so.

David F. Ulmer, S. Ed.

ORobertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 45 S.Ct. 621 (1925).
4(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). See Foster·
Milburn Co. v. Knight, supra note 8.
11 Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 66 S.Ct. 242 (1946).
Congress has done so in anti-trust acts, 15 U.S.C. (1946) §25.
12 Jackson, ''Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution," 45
CoL. L. REv. 1 (1945); Braucher, "The Inconvenient Federal Forum,'' 60 HAnv. L. REv.
908 (1947).
13 Where the defendant would lose a defense, the transfer would not be in the interest
of justice. Bolten v. General Motors Corp., supra note 4.
14 Mere balance of convenience is not enough to call for a transfer. See Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947); Skultety v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 118; Adler v. McKee, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 613.
lt5 See Otto v. Hirl, supra note 7; McCarley v. Foster-Milburn Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1950)
89 F. Supp. 643, reversed sub nom Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, supra note 8.
10 Rule

